The SCS in 2026: PH Chairmanship as a Test of ASEAN’s Security Relevance

Prof. Anna Malindog-Uy, vice-president of the Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not represent the opinions of the institution. These views are purely personal.

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The Philippines’ 2026 ASEAN Chairmanship becomes a critical stress test. As a frontline claimant state, can Manila exercise credible regional leadership without turning ASEAN into a vehicle for bilateral grievance? Conversely, can it avoid diluting international law and national interests in the name of consensus? The challenge is not abstract; it is the practical governance dilemma of a regional organization operating amid intensifying strategic rivalry.

The Philippines enters 2026 with an evolving role: from a litigant asserting legal principles and a security partner of external powers to a potential agenda-setter and consensus broker within ASEAN. The opportunity lies in the chairmanship’s ability to inject urgency into ASEAN’s security agenda. The constraint, however, is perception. A chair with direct stakes risks being viewed as partial, particularly if the SCS agenda is framed through alliance politics or confrontational rhetoric.

The strategic danger is internal polarization within ASEAN. Some member states may come to view the SCS less as a shared regional challenge and more as a proxy battleground between major powers. Such polarization weakens ASEAN centrality not merely because it “fails to speak with one voice,” but because it loses its capacity to convene, set rules, and implement practical conflict-management measures.

Whether the Philippine Chairmanship strengthens or strains ASEAN will depend less on declaratory positions and more on Manila’s ability to reconcile three imperatives: defending international law and the principles that protect small and middle states from coercion; sustaining ASEAN unity and centrality to prevent fragmentation into rival blocs; and preventing escalation in an increasingly militarized and incident-prone maritime environment.

PH-CN SCS Disputes

Moreover, managing the long-standing SCS disputes—particularly between China and the Philippines- requires a genuinely multifaceted approach. First, multilateral engagement remains essential. ASEAN unity provides the only viable platform for pushing toward a credible COC that clarifies expectations and manages disputes, even if it falls short of conflict prevention. Second, targeted bilateral and trilateral dialogues must complement multilateral efforts, addressing specific operational concerns that cannot be resolved through generalized frameworks alone. Third, public diplomacy and strategic communication matter. Claimant states must consistently emphasize commitments to international law and peaceful dispute resolution, reinforcing regional norms rather than inflaming nationalist sentiment. Fourth, diplomacy should extend beyond political and security channels to include economic, cultural, and educational exchanges. These multidimensional relationships help build resilience and mutual understanding that formal negotiations alone cannot achieve.

Equally important is a shift in diplomatic style. Moving away from megaphone diplomacy and zero-sum confrontation toward a more Asian approach to dispute management, one that emphasizes restraint, respect, and the preservation of harmony, can lower frictions without abandoning core interests. This must be accompanied by a mindset shift from “winner-takes-all” thinking toward a collective outlook that treats the SCS as a zone of peace, cooperation, joint development, and shared resource management.

Ground realities, however, remain sobering. Tensions between the Philippines and China persist, particularly around Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., relations appear poised to remain diplomatically cordial but operationally confrontational, dialogue continuing alongside maritime friction and rhetorical exchanges.

External powers further complicate this environment. The expanding military presence of the United States, Japan, Australia, and other partners is viewed by Manila as deterrence, but by Beijing as containment. This divergence reinforces mutual suspicion and raises the risk that local incidents could escalate within a broader strategic rivalry.

Conclusion

Ultimately, achieving a sustainable and peaceful SCS order depends on a committed, layered strategy that blends multilateralism, bilateral engagement, and innovative cooperative frameworks. Focusing on shared regional interests, marine environmental protection, sustainable resource management, and disaster response offers pragmatic avenues for trust-building beyond sovereignty disputes.

Most importantly, transforming the SCS from a zone of tension into a sea of peace and cooperation will not be easy. It requires restraint, creativity, and political will from all parties. The Philippine Chairmanship in 2026 will therefore not be judged by rhetorical firmness alone, but by whether it strengthens ASEAN’s capacity to manage conflict, preserve stability, and remain relevant in an increasingly contested regional order.

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